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Abstract: Does an inflation conservative central bank à la Rogoff (1985) remain 
desirable in a setting with endogenous fiscal policy? To provide an answer we study 
monetary and fiscal policy games without commitment in a dynamic stochastic sticky 
price economy with monopolistic distortions. Monetary policy determines nominal 
interest rates and fiscal policy provides public goods generating private utility. We find 
that lack of fiscal commitment gives rise to excessive public spending. The optimal 
inflation rate internalizing this distortion is positive, but lack of monetary commitment 
robustly generates too much inflation. A conservative monetary authority thus remains 
desirable. When fiscal policy is determined before monetary policy each period, the 
monetary authority should focus exclusively on stabilizing inflation, as this eliminates the 
steady state biases associated with lack of monetary and fiscal commitment. It also leads 
to stabilization policy that is close to if not fully optimal. 
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The di!culties associated with executing optimal but time-inconsistent policy
plans have received much attention following the seminal work of Kydland and
Prescott (1977) and Barro and Gordon (1983). Time inconsistency problems,
however, have hardly been analyzed in a dynamic setting where monetary and
ﬁscal policymakers are separate authorities engaged in a non-cooperative policy
game. This may appear surprising given that the institutional setup in most
developed countries suggests such an analysis to be of relevance.
In this paper we analyze non-cooperative monetary and ﬁscal policy games
assuming that policymakers cannot commit to future policy choices. We start
by identifying the policy biases emerging from sequential and non-cooperative
decision making and show how these biases interact with each other. We then
provide a normative analysis assessing the implications of installing a central
bank that is conservative in the sense of Rogo (1985).1 In other terms, we an-
alyze the desirability of central bank conservatism in a setting with endogenous
ﬁscal policy.
Presented is a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model without capi-
tal, along the lines of Rotemberg (1982) and Woodford (2003), featuring three
sources of distortions: (1) the presence of monopolistically competitive ﬁrms,
which cause equilibrium output to be ine!ciently low; (2) rigidities to price
adjustment, which give rise to real eects of monetary policy; (3) policymakers
than cannot credibly commit to a path for future policy, but instead determine
policy sequentially, i.e., at the time of implementation.
In line with recent monetary policy models, we consider a monetary author-
ity determining the short-term nominal interest rate. We add to this a ﬁscal
authority deciding about the level of public goods provision. Public goods gen-
erate utility for private agents and are ﬁnanced by lump sum taxes, so as to
balance the government’s intertemporal budget.
While all policymakers are assumed benevolent, i.e., they maximize the util-
ity of the representative agent, lack of commitment gives rise to suboptimal
policy outcomes. In particular, since output is ine!ciently low, both policy-
makers are tempted to increase output, either via lowering real interest rates
(monetary authority) or via increasing public spending (ﬁscal authority). Com-
pared to a situation with policy commitment, this results in an inﬂationary bias
and in overspending on public goods. The ine!ciency arises because both poli-
cymakers fail to fully internalize the welfare cost of generating inﬂation today.
The presence of nominal rigidities requires price setters to be forward-looking,
i.e., their price setting decisions depend positively on expected future inﬂation.
Policymakers that decide sequentially fail to perceive the implications of their
1Walsh (1995) and Svensson (1997) discuss alternative institutional arrangements for over-
coming the problems related to the lack of monetary commitment.
1current policy decisions on pricing decisions in the past, since past prices can
be taken as given at the time policy is determined. As a result, sequentially
deciding policymakers underestimate the welfare costs of generating inﬂation
today and are tempted to move output closer to its ﬁrst-best level.
In our setting monetary and ﬁscal policy interact in interesting ways. In
particular, taking the lack of ﬁscal commitment as given, it becomes optimal for
monetary policy to implement positive inﬂation rates.2 We show that positive
inﬂation rates reduce the ﬁscal spending bias and thereby increase agents’ utility.
This suggests that - unlike in the standard case with exogenous ﬁscal policy - a
conservative central bank may not be desirable. Yet, a quantitative assessment
suggests that the optimal deviations from price stability tend to be small. And
more importantly, in the non-cooperative Markov-perfect Nash equilibrium with
sequential monetary and ﬁscal policy, the steady state inﬂation rate lies above
the optimal inﬂation rate for a wide range of model parameterizations.3 This
suggests that installing an inﬂation conservative central bank remains desirable
with endogenous ﬁscal policy.
We then formally introduce a conservative central bank that maximizes a
weighted sum of an inﬂation loss term and the representative agent’s utility.
And we characterize the resulting Markov-perfect equilibria.
For the case where policies are determined simultaneously or the case where
monetary policy is determined before ﬁscal policy each period, it fails to be
possible to eliminate entirely the steady state distortions via monetary conser-
vatism alone. There is either positive inﬂation or ﬁscal overspending or both.
Nevertheless, we ﬁnd that an appropriate degree of monetary conservatism is
desirable, as it eliminates most of the steady state welfare losses arising from
the lack of monetary and ﬁscal commitment.
Monetary conservatism is even more desirable if ﬁscal policy is determined
before monetary policy each period (arguably the most relevant timing proto-
col). In such a setting monetary conservatism is internalized by ﬁscal policy and
this makes it possible to reduce the inﬂation bias as well as the public spending
bias. In particular, a monetary authority that cares exclusively about stabiliz-
ing inﬂation allows to recover the Ramsey steady state, i.e., fully eliminates the
biases stemming from lack of monetary and ﬁscal commitment. The case for a
conservative central bank may thus appear even stronger once endogenous ﬁscal
policy is considered.
We also brieﬂy address the issue of how the conduct of stabilization policy
is aected by the presence of a conservative central bank. In particular, we
2In our setting, a monetary authority controlling nominal interest rates U has full control
over the steady state inﬂation rate , as it has to satisfy U = 31,w h e r e denotes the
discount factor. See equation (9).
3Markov-perfect Nash equilibria, as deﬁned in Maskin and Tirole (2001), are a standard
reﬁnement used in the applied dynamic games literature, e.g., Klein et al. (2006).
2show that ﬁscal leadership in combination with a fully conservative central bank
allows to implement the ﬂexible price Ramsey policy response to technology and
mark-up shocks. This suggests that monetary conservatism has also desirable
stabilization properties.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. After discussing the re-
lated literature in section 2, section 3 introduces the economic model and derives
the implementability constraints characterizing private sector behavior. Section
4 considers monetary and ﬁscal policy with and without commitment, derives
analytical results about the policy biases resulting from lack of commitment,
and discusses how these biases interact with each other. In section 5 we provide
a quantitative assessment of the steady state eects generated by sequential
monetary and ﬁscal policymaking. Section 6 introduces a conservative central
bank and analyzes the welfare gains associated with monetary conservatism.
A conclusion brieﬂy summarizes the results and provides an outlook for future
work. Technical material is contained in the appendix.
2 Related Literature
Problems of optimal monetary and ﬁscal policy are traditionally studied within
the optimal taxation framework introduced by Frank Ramsey (1927). In the
so-called Ramsey literature, monetary and ﬁscal authorities are treated as a
‘single’ authority and decisions are taken at time zero, e.g., Chari and Kehoe
(1999).4 In seminal contributions, Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and
Gordon (1983) show that time zero optimal choices might be time-inconsistent,
i.e., reoptimization in successive periods would imply a dierent policy to be
optimal than the one initially envisaged.
The monetary policy literature has extensively studied time-inconsistency
problems in dynamic settings and potential solutions to it, e.g., Rogo (1985),
Svensson (1997) and Walsh (1995). However, in this literature ﬁscal policy
is typically absent or assumed exogenous to the model. Similarly, a number
of contributions analyze sequential ﬁscal decisions and the time-consistency of
optimal ﬁscal plans in dynamic general equilibrium models, e.g., Lucas and
Stokey (1983), Chari and Kehoe (1990) or Klein, Krusell, and Ríos-Rull (2006).
This literature typically studies models without money.
An important strand of the literature, developed by Sargent and Wallace
(1981), Leeper (1991), and Woodford (2001), studies monetary and ﬁscal policy
interactions using policy rules, e.g., Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2007) and Ferrero
(2005). This literature, however, does not consider time-inconsistency problems,
as it assumes policymakers to be fully committed to simple rules.
4Galí and Monacelli (2005) extend the Ramsey approach to the case of a monetary union,
i.e., an environment with a single monetary authority but many ﬁscal decision makers.
3A range of papers discusses monetary and ﬁscal policy interactions with and
without commitment in a static framework where monetary and ﬁscal policy-
makers interact only once, e.g., Alesina and Tabellini (1987). This paper goes
beyond these earlier contributions by studying a fully dynamic and stochastic
model where current economic outcomes are inﬂuenced also by expectations
about the future. This is similar in spirit to a recent paper by Díaz-Giménez et
al. (2006) which determines sequential optimal policy in a fully dynamic cash-
in-advance economy with government debt. While they study a ﬂexible price
model in which interactions between monetary and ﬁscal policy operate through
seigniorage and the government budget constraint, we abstract from seigniorage
as a source of government revenue. Instead, we focus on the interactions arising
from the presence of nominal rigidities.
3 The Economy
In the next sections we ﬁrst introduce a sticky-price economy model, similar to
the one studied in Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004), then we derive the private
sector equilibrium for dierent monetary and ﬁscal policy regimes.
3.1 Private Sector




wx(fw>k w>j w) (1)
where fw denotes consumption of an aggregate consumption good, kw 5 [0>1]
labor eort, jw public goods provision by the government in the form of aggregate
consumption goods, and  5 (0>1) the subjective discount factor. Throughout
the paper we assume:
Condition 1 x(f>k>j) is separable in f>k> and j.M o r e o v e r ,xf A 0, xff ? 0,








¯ ¯ ¯ are bounded for (f>k>j) 5
[0>1] × [0>1] × [0>1].
Each household produces a dierentiated intermediate good. Demand for






where |w denotes (private and public) demand for the aggregate good, e Sw is the
nominal price of the good produced by the household, and Sw is the nominal
price of the aggregate good. The demand function g(·) satisﬁes
g(1) = 1
g0(1) = w
4where w 5 (4>1) is the price elasticity of demand for the dierent goods.
This elasticity is assumed to be time-varying and induces ﬂuctuations in the mo-
nopolistic mark-up charged by ﬁrms. The assumed demand function is consis-
tent with optimizing individual behavior when private and public consumption
goods are a Dixit-Stiglitz aggregate of the goods produced by dierent house-
holds.5 The household chooses e Sw, then hires the necessary amount of labor
eort e kw to satisfy the resulting product demand, i.e.,






where }w denotes an aggregate technology shock. We assume the mark-up shock
and the technology shock to follow AR(1) stochastic processes, respectively,
w = (1  )+w1 + %w
}w =( 1 })+}}w1 + %}w
where ?1 denotes the steady value of the price elasticity of demand, and
the innovations %lw (l = >}) are mean zero, independent both across time and
cross-sectionally, with small bounded support.
Following Rotemberg (1982), we describe sluggish nominal price adjustment









where A0 measures the degree of price stickiness. The ﬂow budget constraint





















where Uw is the gross nominal interest rate, Ew denotes nominal bonds that pay
UwEw in period w +1 , zw is the real wage paid in a competitive labor market,
and ow are lump sum taxes.
Although bonds are the only available ﬁnancial instrument, assuming com-
plete ﬁnancial markets instead would make no dierence for the analysis, since
households have identical incomes in a symmetric price setting equilibrium.
One should note that we abstract from money holdings. This can be inter-
preted as the ‘cashless limit’ of a model economy with money, see Woodford












w denotes the input of the good produced by
household l.
5(1998). Money thus imposes only a lower bound on the nominal interest rate,
i.e., Uw  1,e a c hp e r i o d . 6









Ew+m  0 (4)
that has to hold each period and at all contingencies.
The household’s problem consists of choosing {fw>k w>e kw> e Sw>E w}4
w=0 so as to
maximize (1) subject to (2), (3) and (4) taking as given {|w>S w>z w>U w>j w>o w}4
w=0.
Using equation (2) to substitute e kw in (3) and letting the multiplier on (3) be
w
Sw, the ﬁrst order conditions of the household’s problem are then equations (2),






































Sw denotes the relative price and w  Sw
Sw1 is the gross consumer






which has to hold each period and at all contingencies.
3.2 Government
The government consists of two authorities, i.e., a monetary authority setting
short-term nominal interest rates and a ﬁscal authority deciding on government
expenditures and lump sum taxes.
6Abstracting from money entails that we ignore possible seigniorage revenues generated in
t h ep r e s e n c eo fp o s i t i v en o m i n a li n t e r e s tr a t e s .S i n c ew ea l l o wf o rl u m ps u mt a x e s ,o n ec a n
safely ignore the ﬁscal implications of such revenues.
6Government expenditures consist of spending related to the provision of
public goods jw and socially wasteful expenditure { that does not generate
utility for private agents. The level of public goods provision jw is a choice
variable, while { is taken to be exogenous. The government’s budget constraint
is then given by
Ew = Uw1Ew1 + Sw(jw + {  ow) (7)
The availability of lump sum taxes ow implies that decisions regarding tax versus
debt ﬁnancing do not matter for equilibrium determination. Ricardian equiva-
lence applies as long as the implied paths for the debt level satisfy the no-Ponzi
scheme borrowing constraint (4) and the transversality condition (6) at all con-
tingencies. For sake of simplicity, we assume taxes to be set such that the level
of real debt Ew
Sw remains bounded from below and asymptotically grows at a rate
less than 1
. Constraints (4) and (6) are then always satisﬁed and can be ignored
from now on. Fiscal policy is thus ‘passive’ in the sense of Leeper (1991).
Note that equation (7) assumes government purchases are subject to the
same monopoly mark-up as purchases by consumers. Assuming instead the
government faces a dierent mark-up would not aect the resulting equilibrium
allocations. The availability of lump sum taxes allows the government to raise
additional income without generating distortions; proﬁt income from sales to
the government and taxes exactly oset each other in the households’ budget
constraint.
3.3 Private Sector Equilibrium
In a symmetric price setting equilibrium the relative price is given by uw =1
for all w. From the assumptions made in the previous section, it follows that
the ﬁrst order conditions of households behavior can be condensed into a price
setting equation










+ Hwxfw+1(w+1  1)w+1 (8)







A private sector rational expectations equilibrium is then a set of plans
{fw>k w>E w>S w} satisfying equations (8) and (9), the government budget con-
straint (7), and the market-clearing condition
}wkw = fw +

2
(w  1)2 + jw + { (10)
given the policies {jw>o w>U w  1},t h ev a l u eo f{, the exogenous stochastic processes
{w>} w}, and the initial conditions U1E1 and S1.
73.4 Time Inconsistency Problems
Under commitment policymakers determine the entire state-contingent sequence
of future policies at the beginning of time. Instead, if policymakers cannot com-
mit to future policy plans, they decide about policies at the time of implemen-
tation, i.e., period by period. We refer to such behavior as sequential decision
making. As we argue below, sequential policy leads to suboptimal outcomes.
Consider the price setting equation (8). As can be seen, ﬁrms’ proﬁt max-
imizing rate of price increase in period w is a function of the expected rate of
price increase from w to w+1. Policymakers’ actions in period w+1will inﬂuence
the equilibrium price level in w+1, but from the perspective of period w+1the
prices in period w can be taken as given. Therefore, policymakers that determine
policies in period w +1will fail to incorporate the impact of their policy deci-
sions on period w inﬂation rates. Yet, the private sector rationally anticipates
the policy decisions in period w+1. From the perspective of period w,s e q u e n t i a l
decision making in period w +1is therefore suboptimal.
Sequentially deciding policymakers fail to take fully into account the welfare
implications of their policy choices. In the present setting, policymakers will
underestimate the welfare costs of generating inﬂation today.
4M o n e t a r y a n d F i s c a l P o l i c y R e g i m e s
In this section we study the outcomes associated with dierent degrees of com-
mitment in monetary and ﬁscal policy. The main focus in on the steady state
implications of the dierent policy regimes. Consideration of the responses to
mark-up and productivity shocks is deferred to section 6.
It turns out useful to start by analyzing the ﬁrst-best allocation, i.e., the
allocation that would be achieved in the absence of monopoly distortions and
nominal rigidities. In a second step we consider the Ramsey allocation, which
takes into account both distortions, but assumes commitment to policies at time
zero. In a ﬁnal step we relax the assumption of policy commitment.
4.1 First-Best Allocation








}wkw = fw + jw + { (11)
where equation (11) is the resource constraint. The steady state ﬁrst-order
conditions deliver
xf = xj = xk
8showing, as expected, that it is optimal to equate the marginal utility of private
and public consumption to the marginal disutility of labor eort. The next
section shows that this ceases to be optimal once monopoly and price setting
distortions are taken into account.
4.2 Ramsey Policy
Assuming commitment to policies at time zero and full cooperation between






wx(fw>k w>j w) (12)
s.t.
Equations (8)>(9)>(10) for all w
The Ramsey planner maximizes the utility function of the representative agent
subject to the implementability constraints (8) and (9), which summarize the
price setting and monopoly distortion in the economy, the feasibility constraint
(10), and the lower bound on nominal interest rates.8 As shown in appendix





















fxff  0. Equation (13) shows that monopolistic competition
creates a wedge between the marginal utility of private consumption and the
marginal disutility of work. This reﬂects the fact that labor fails to receive its
marginal product when ﬁrms have monopoly power, which causes housholds to
reduce consumption of produced goods and to increase consumption of leisure.9
7Since Ricardian equivalence holds we ignore the ﬁnancing decisions of the ﬁscal authority
and the initial debt level U31E31, which do not matter for equilibrium determination of the
other variables. Since the initial condition S31 simply normalizes the implied price level path,
it can equally be ignored.
8In what follows, we abstract from the non stationary component of time zero optimal
policies. In our numerical application we ascertain that the time zero commitment policies
asymptotically approach the steady states values reported below and also verify that the non
stationary component does not alter the welfare conclusions.
9From equations (5) and (13), it follows that z =
1+
 ? 1 in steady state, i.e., real wages
fall short of their marginal product.
9For xkk ? 0,o n eh a stA0 and equation (14) implies that the optimal level of
public spending falls short of equating the marginal utility of public consumption
to the marginal disutility of work, unlike in the ﬁrst best allocation. At ﬁrst, one
might think that the optimal provision of public goods should not be aected by
the presence of a monopolistic mark-up, since the availability of lump sum taxes
implies that the government can ﬁnance the price mark-up without generating
additional distortions. Yet, reduced public spending also reduces the marginal
disutility of work and thereby helps to increase the ine!ciently low level of
private consumption. To see how, note that reducing government spending
and lump sum taxation correspondingly has no wealth eects on households, as
household income and taxes are reduced by exactly the same amount. Reducing
spending and taxes, therefore, aects the households’ problem only via a reduced
marginal disutility of work.
4.3 Sequential Policymaking
We now consider separate monetary and ﬁscal authorities that cannot commit
to future policy plans, instead they decide policies at the time of implemen-
tation, i.e., period-by-period. To facilitate the exposition, we assume that a
sequentially deciding policymaker takes as given the current policy choice of the
other policymaker as well as all future policies and future private sector choices.
We prove the rationality of this assumption at the end of this section.
4.3.1 Sequential Fiscal Policy
Consider sequential ﬁscal policymaking. Given the assumptions made above,






mx(fw+m>k w+m>j w+m) (15)
s.t.
Equations (8)>(9)>(10) for all w
{fw+m>k w+m>w+m>U w+m1  1>j w+m} given for m  1
As shown in appendix A.2, the ﬁrst order conditions associated with problem














where the ﬁscal authority sets the level of public goods provision jw such that
FRF is satisﬁed, each period.
Consider a steady state in which  =1 , i.e., with an inﬂation rate equal
to the one chosen by the Ramsey planner. The ﬁscal reaction function then
simpliﬁes to
xj = xk (16)
10showing that ﬁscal policy equates the marginal utility of public consumption to
the marginal disutility of labor eort. While such behavior is consistent with
the ﬁrst-best allocation, it is generally suboptimal in the presence of monopolis-
tic distortions, see the discussion in section 4.2. Sequential ﬁscal policy implies
a suboptimally high level of public spending, i.e., a ‘ﬁscal spending bias’. This
spending bias causes the Ramsey allocation to be unattainable in the presence
of sequential ﬁscal policy, because either inﬂation, ﬁscal spending, or both must
deviate from their Ramsey values. This is summarized in the following propo-
sition.
Proposition 1 For xkk ? 0, sequential ﬁscal policy implies excessive ﬁscal
spending in the presence of price stability.
The economic intuition underlying this result is as follows. By taking future
decisions and the current monetary policy choice Uw as given, the ﬁscal authority
considers private consumption fw to be determined by the Euler equation (9).
Given this, the ﬁscal authority perceives labor input kw to move one-for-one with
government spending jw. In a situation with price stability, the inﬂation costs
of public spending are zero (at the margin) and can be ignored. This causes the
sequential spending rule (16) to appear optimal. In the general case  6=1 ,t h e
marginal costs of inﬂation fail to be zero, leading to the more general expression
given in FRF.
4.3.2 Sequential Monetary Policy
We now consider sequential monetary policy. Given the assumptions made






mx(fw+m>k w+m>j w+m) (17)
s.t.
Equations (8),(9),(10) for all w
{fw+m>k w+m>w+m>U w+m  1>j w+m1} given for m  1
As shown in appendix A.3, the ﬁrst order conditions associated with problem










+2 w  1 
xffw
xfw
(w  1)((w  1)w  }wkw (1 + w)) = 0 (MRF)
where the monetary authority sets the nominal interest rate Uw such that MRF
is satisﬁed, each period. Appendix A.4 proves the following result.
Proposition 2 For  su!ciently close to 1, sequential monetary policy implies
a strictly positive rate of inﬂation in steady state.
11Sequential monetary policy thus generates an inﬂation bias as in the stan-
dard case with exogenous ﬁscal policy, e.g., Svensson (1997). Intuitively, the
monetary authority is tempted to stimulate demand by lowering nominal inter-
est rates. Since price adjustments are costly, the price level will not fully adjust,
real interest rates fall, stimulating demand. The real wage increase required
to satisfy this additional demand generates inﬂation, but the welfare costs of
inﬂation are not fully taken into account for reasons discussed before.
4.3.3 Sequential Monetary and Fiscal Policy
We now deﬁne a Markov-perfect Nash equilibrium with sequential monetary
and ﬁscal policy. We start by verifying the rationality of our initial assumption
that a sequentially deciding policymaker can take as given the current policy
choice of the other policymaker, as well as all future policies and future private
sector decisions.
The private sector’s optimality conditions (8) and (9), the feasibility con-
straint (10), as well as the policy reactions functions (FRF) and (MRF), all
depend on current and future variables only. This suggests the existence of
an equilibrium where current play is a function of the current exogenous vari-
ables }w and w only. Future play then depends on future exogenous variables
only, thereby justifying the assumption that future equilibrium play (and o-
equilibrium play) is independent of current play. If each period, in addition,
monetary and ﬁscal policy are determined simultaneously, Nash equilibrium re-
quires taking the other players’ current decisions as given. This justiﬁes the
assumptions made in deriving (FRF) and (MRF) and motivates the following
deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 3 (SP) A stationary Markov-perfect Nash equilibrium with sequen-
tial monetary and ﬁscal policy consists of time-invariant policy functions f(}w> w)>
k(}w> w)> (}w> w)>U (}w> w)>j (}w> w) solving equations (8),(9),(10), (FRF) and
(MRF).
We now show that assuming Stackelberg leadership by one of the policy
authorities, instead of simultaneous decision making, does not aect the equi-
librium outcome. While the policy problem of the Stackelberg follower remains
unchanged, the Stackelberg leader should take into account the reaction func-
tion of the follower. Importantly, however, the Lagrange multipliers associated
with additionally imposing either MRF in the sequential ﬁscal problem (15) or
FRF in the sequential monetary problem (17) are zero. In fact, these reaction
functions can be derived from the ﬁrst order conditions of the leader’s policy
problem even when the follower’s reaction function is not being imposed.
Intuitively, the leadership structure does not matter for the equilibrium out-
come because the monetary and ﬁscal authorities are pursuing the same policy
objective. Any departure of the equilibrium outcome from the Ramsey solution
12is thus entirely due to the assumption of sequential decision making. However,
t h ep r e s e n c eo fd i erent policymakers and the sequence of moves will matter in
section 6 when we consider a monetary authority that is more inﬂation averse
than the ﬁscal authority.
4.4 Monetary and Fiscal Policy Interactions
This section analyzes how the ﬁscal spending bias and agents’ utility is aected
by the steady state inﬂation rate. Since steady state inﬂation depends on steady
state nominal interest rates only, see equation (9), we implicitly analyze how
the conduct of monetary policy aects ﬁscal policy and welfare. Appendix A.5
derives the following result.
Proposition 4 Assume xkk ? 0. In a steady state with sequential ﬁscal pol-
icy, agents’ utility increases and ﬁscal spending decreases with the steady state
inﬂation rate, locally at  =1 .
The previous proposition implies that price stability ceases to be optimal
once ﬁscal policy fails to commit to its spending plans and is described by FRF.
Intuitively, inﬂation increases the perceived costs of public spending for the
ﬁscal authority, thereby reduces the ﬁscal spending bias. This makes it optimal
to implement positive inﬂation rates.
The optimal inﬂation rate that appropriately internalizes the sequential ﬁscal






wx(fw>k w>j w) (OI)
s.t.
Equations (8),(9),(10),(FRF) for all w
Here we assume that monetary policy can commit, but ﬁscal behavior is de-
scribed by FRF. We will refer to this situation as the optimal inﬂation (OI)
regime. If the optimal inﬂation rate is lower (higher) than the inﬂation bias
generated in a Markov-perfect Nash equilibrium with sequential monetary and
ﬁscal policy, an inﬂation conservative (liberal) central bank would appear desir-
able. Whether the optimal inﬂation rate is above or below the inﬂation bias is
ultimately a quantitative issue. We address it in the next section.
5 Quantitative Evaluation of Policy Biases
In this section we explore the quantitative importance of relaxing the assump-
tion of monetary and ﬁscal policy commitment. In particular, we quantify the
10As before, we abstract from non-stationary components of time zero optimal policies in
the solution to (OI).
13welfare implications associated with the presence of steady state biases in in-
ﬂation and public spending. In addition, we compare the steady state outcome
under sequential policy (SP) to that achieved under the optimal inﬂation (OI)
regime.
5.1 Parameterization
We assume the following preference speciﬁcation, which satisﬁes condition 1 and
is consistent with balanced growth,





+ $j log(jw) (18)
with $k A 0, $j  0 and *  0 denoting the inverse of the Frisch labor supply
elasticity.
The baseline calibration of the model is summarized in table 1. The quarterly
discount factor  is chosen to match the average ex-post U.S. real interest rate
during the period 1983:1-2002:4, i.e., 3=5%. The steady state value for the price
elasticity of demand  is set at 6, implying a mark-up over marginal cost
of 20%. The degree of price stickiness  is chosen to be 17=5, such that the
log-linearized version of the Phillips curve (8) is consistent with the estimates
of Sbordone (2002), as in Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004). The elasticity of
labor eort is assumed to be one (* =1 ) and we abstract from wasteful ﬁscal
spending, i.e., { =0 . The utility weights $k and $j are chosen such that in the
Ramsey steady state agents work 20% of their time (k =0 =2) and spend 20% of
output on public goods (j =0 =04).11 The process for the technology shock }w
is taken from Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004).12 The parameterization for the
mark-up shock process w is taken from Ireland (2004).13
To test the robustness of our results, we consider also a wide range of alter-
native model parameterizations. For comparability, the utility weights $k and
$j are adjusted so as to leave the Ramsey steady state unchanged.
The actual computational method we employ to numerically solve for the
Markov-perfect Nash equilibrium with sequential monetary and ﬁscal policy
is described in appendix A.7. A useful by-product of this approach is that it
delivers second-order accurate welfare expressions for economies with a distorted
steady state, while relying on linear-quadratic approximation only.
11The values of $k and $j are set according to equations (47) and (48), respectively, derived
in appendix A.6.
12To transform the annual values reported in table 1 of Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004),
we raise the AR-coe!cient of the technology shock to the power 1/4 and divide the standard
deviation of the shock innovation by 4.
13Table 1 in Ireland (2004) presents estimates for the scaled mark-up shock process
w
 .
Multiplying his estimate for the standard deviation by our price adjustment cost  =1 7 =5
yields the standard deviation in our table 1. Ireland’s estimate for the technology shock
process is similar to the one used in this paper.
145.2 Steady State Implications
Employing the baseline calibration summarized in table 1, we now investigate
the quantitative impact of relaxing monetary and ﬁscal policy commitment. In
addition, we compare the outcome under sequential policy (SP) to that achieved
under the optimal inﬂation (OI) regime. Finally, we analyze the robustness of
the quantitative ﬁndings to dierent model parameterizations.
The ﬁrst row of table 2 presents information on the steady state in the SP
regime. All variables are expressed as percentage deviations from their corre-
sponding Ramsey steady state values.14 The last column of the table reports
the steady state welfare loss, expressed in terms of the permanent reduction in
private consumption that would imply the Ramsey steady state to be welfare
equivalent to the considered policy regime.15 In line with proposition 2, the
sequential policy outcome is characterized by an inﬂation bias, which turns out
to be sizable. In addition, there is a small ﬁscal spending bias. Overall, the
welfare losses generated by the sequential conduct of policy are fairly large, in
the order of 1% of steady state consumption per period.
The second row of table 2 shows the outcome under the OI regime. The
optimal inﬂation rate turns out to be not only lower than the one in the SP
regime but also very close to the Ramsey value. Note that reducing inﬂation
from the level of the SP regime to the optimal level increases the ﬁscal spending
bias, as suggested by proposition 4. While the ﬁscal spending increase associated
with reduced inﬂation is fairly large, implementing the optimal inﬂation rate
nevertheless eliminates large part of the welfare losses associated with the SP
regime. This suggests that the ﬁscal spending bias, despite being sizable in
absolute value, is not very detrimental in welfare terms. Clearly, this result
hinges partly on the assumed availability of lump sum taxes.
The results from table 2 suggest that - for the particular parameterization
considered thus far - installing a conservative monetary authority is desirable
in a situation where lack of ﬁscal commitment is described by FRF. The op-
timal inﬂation rate is well below the one emerging in the SP regime. Also, a
conservative monetary authority may eliminate large part of the welfare losses
associated with sequential monetary and ﬁscal policymaking.
Table 3 explores the robustness of the previous ﬁndings to a wide range of
changes in the model parameterization.16 The table reports the steady state
welfare losses associated with the dierent policy regimes in the middle column
and suggests that the previous ﬁndings are robust. In particular, signiﬁcant
14In the Ramsey steady state f =0 =16, k =0 =2, j =0 =04 and  =1 .
15Appendix A.8 explains how to compute these welfare losses.
16For all parametrizations considered in table 3, the utility weights $k and $j are adjusted
to leave the Ramsey steady state unchanged. When considering wasteful ﬁscal expenditure
f + {, k and j are required to remain unchanged.
15welfare gains can be realized from implementing the optimal inﬂation rate. Ex-
ceptions are the ﬂexible price limit ( $ 0) and the cases with inelastic labor
supply (large values for *). For these cases the time-inconsistency problems of
monetary and ﬁscal policy disappear and real allocations approach the Ramsey
steady state under SP. Table 3 also reports the dierence between inﬂation in
the SP regime and the optimal inﬂation rate (right column). For all parame-
terizations the optimal inﬂation rate (OI) is below the one emerging in the SP
regime. This suggests an inﬂation conservative monetary authority to be desir-
able in all these settings, provided FRF describes ﬁscal behavior. We investigate
this issue in detail in the next section.
6 Conservative Monetary Authority
This section analyzes whether the distortions stemming from sequential mone-
tary and ﬁscal policy decisions can be reduced by installing a central bank that
is more inﬂation averse than society. Rogo (1985) and Svensson (1997) have
shown this to be the case if ﬁscal policy is treated as exogenous.
Following Rogo (1985), we consider a ‘weight conservative’ monetary au-
thority with period utility function
(1  )x(fw+m>k w+m>j w+m)  
(w  1)2
2
where  5 [0>1] is a measure of monetary conservatism. For A0 the mone-
tary authority dislikes inﬂation (and deﬂation) more than society; if  =1the
policymaker cares about inﬂation only. The preferences of the ﬁscal authority
remain unchanged.
With monetary and ﬁscal authorities now pursuing dierent policy objec-
tives, the equilibrium outcome will depend on the timing of policy moves, i.e.,
on whether ﬁscal policy is determined before, after, or simultaneously with
monetary policy each period. Casual observation suggests that it takes longer
to enact ﬁscal decisions, which would imply that ﬁscal policy is determined
before monetary policy. At the same time, the time lag between a monetary
policy decision and its eects on the economy may also be substantial. It thus
remains to be ascertained, which of these timing structures is the most relevant
for actual economies. For these reasons, we consider Nash as well as leadership
equilibria.
6.1 Nash and Leadership Equilibria
This section deﬁnes the various Markov-perfect equilibria in the presence of a
conservative monetary authority. As will be clariﬁed below, with simultaneous
monetary and ﬁscal decisions (Nash case) and with monetary policy determined
before ﬁscal policy (monetary leadership), sequential ﬁscal behavior remains
16described by FRF, i.e., by the reaction function in the absence of a conservative
central bank. This diers from the situation where ﬁscal policy is determined
before monetary policy (ﬁscal leadership), because the ﬁscal authority takes
into account the conservative monetary authority’s reaction function. Monetary
p o l i c yc a nt h e nu s e‘ o -equilibrium’ behavior to discipline the behavior of the
ﬁscal authority along the equilibrium path. Fiscal leadership thus opens the
possibility for outcomes that are welfare superior to those achieved in the OI
regime.
First, consider the case with simultaneous decisions. While the policy prob-
















Equations (8),(9),(10) for all w
{fw+m>k w+m>w+m>U w+m  1>j w+m1} given for m  1
As shown in appendix A.9, the ﬁrst order conditions associated with problem
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For  =0 , CMRF reduces to the monetary reaction function without conser-
vatism (MRF).17 This motivates the following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 5 (CSP-Nash) A stationary Markov-perfect Nash equilibrium with
sequential and conservative monetary policy, sequential ﬁscal policy and simul-
taneous policy decisions consists of policy functions f(}w> w)>k (}w> w)> (}w> w)>
U(}w> w)>j (}w> w) solving equations (8), (9), (10), (FRF) and (CMRF).
Next, we consider the case of monetary leadership (ML). The conservative
monetary authority must take into account how the ﬁscal authority will react
to its own decisions, i.e., FRF needs to be imposed as an additional constraint.
17As before, CMRF implies that current interest rates depend on current economic condi-
tions only, validating the conjecture in (19) that in a Markov-perfect equilibrium future policy
choices can be taken as given.















Equations (8),(9),(10),(FRF) for all w
{fw+m>k w+m>w+m>U w+m  1>j w+m} given for m  1
The ﬁrst order conditions associated with problem (20) deliver the conserva-
tive monetary reaction function with monetary leadership, that we denote by
CMRF-ML. This gives rise to the following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 6 (CSP-ML) A stationary Markov-perfect equilibrium with sequen-
tial and conservative monetary policy, sequential ﬁscal policy and monetary pol-
icy deciding before ﬁscal policy consists of policy functions f(}w> w)>k (}w> w)>
(}w> w)>U (}w> w)>j (}w> w) solving equations (8), (9), (10), (FRF) and (CMRF-
ML).
Finally, we consider the case of ﬁscal leadership (FL). The ﬁscal authority
must now take into account the conservative monetary authority’s reaction, i.e.,






mx(fw+m>k w+m>j w+m) (21)
s.t.
Equations (8),(9),(10), (CMRF) for all w
{fw+m>k w+m>w+m>U w+m  1>j w+m} given for m  1
The ﬁrst order conditions associated with problem (21) deliver the corresponding
ﬁscal reaction function that we denote by CFRF-FL. We propose the following
deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 7 (CSP-FL) A stationary Markov-perfect equilibrium with sequen-
tial and conservative monetary policy, sequential ﬁscal policy, and ﬁscal policy
deciding before monetary policy consists of policy functions f(}w> w)>k (}w> w)>
(}w> w)>U (}w> w)>j (}w> w) solving equations (8), (9), (10), (CFRF-FL) and
(CMRF).
6.2 Steady State Implications
We characterize the steady state implications for the various timing arrange-
ments in the presence of an inﬂation conservative central bank. The subsequent
propositions summarize our main ﬁndings.
18Proposition 8 The Ramsey steady state is consistent with sequential policy-
making in a regime with ﬁscal leadership, if the monetary authority is fully
conservative ( =1 ).
The proof is provided in appendix A.10.
Proposition 9 For xkk ? 0, the Ramsey steady cannot be achieved with se-
quential policymaking in a regime with monetary leadership or simultaneous
moves, for any degree of monetary conservatism.
Proof. With monetary leadership or simultaneous moves the ﬁscal reaction
function (FRF) describes the behavior of the ﬁscal authority, see deﬁnitions 5
and 6. Proposition 1 implies that either inﬂation or ﬁscal spending or both must
deviate from their Ramsey steady state values.
Fiscal leadership and a fully conservative central bank allow to implement the
Ramsey steady state, but with simultaneous decisions or monetary leadership
this fails to be possible. Fiscal leadership diers from the other arrangements
because the ﬁscal authority anticipates the within period reaction of the mon-
etary authority. In particular, for  =1the monetary authority is determined
to implement price stability at all costs. A ﬁscal expansion above the Ramsey
spending level generates inﬂationary pressures and thus triggers an increase in
interest rates so as to restrain private consumption. The ﬁscal authority inter-
nalizes that ﬁscal spending crowds out private consumption, unlike in the Nash
case or the case with monetary leadership. This disciplines ﬁscal behavior and
allows the implementation of the Ramsey steady state.
Proposition 9 shows that it fails to be possible to fully recover the Ramsey
steady state in the Nash case or in the case with monetary leadership. The
ﬁndings from section 5 suggest, however, that a conservative monetary authority
remains nevertheless desirable under these timing arrangements in which ﬁscal
behavior is described by FRF. The optimal inﬂation rate (OI) was found to be
below the one emerging under sequential policy (SP) for a wide range of model
paramterizations. Moreover, most of the steady state welfare losses arising with
a SP regime are eliminated in the OI regime.
We illustrate this point in ﬁgure 1, for the baseline calibration of section 5.
The ﬁgure displays the steady state welfare gains associated with intermediate
degrees of monetary conservatism  5 [0>1], for all the timing arrangements.
The upper horizontal line shown in the ﬁgure indicates the welfare losses of
the OI regime. For the Nash and monetary leadership (ML) regimes, a fully
conservative monetary authority ( =1 ) approximately implements the steady
state welfare level associated with the OI regime.18 Thus, even in a situation
with simultaneous decisions or monetary leadership, it remains possible to re-
cover the signiﬁcant welfare losses resulting from lack of monetary commitment
18As will become clear from ﬁgure 2 below, the welfare level of the OI regime is actually
achieved by a value of  very close but slightly below 1.
19through an appropriate degree of monetary conservatism. Interestingly, most
of the welfare gains are achieved for values of  above 0.9, i.e., by a su!ciently
conservative central bank caring almost exclusively about inﬂation.
Using again the baseline calibration, ﬁgure 2 illustrates how the steady state
values of private consumption, labor eort, inﬂation and public spending de-
pend on the degree of monetary conservatism. While an increase in monetary
conservatism reduces the inﬂation bias for all timing protocols, its eect on the
ﬁscal spending bias depends on whether or not ﬁscal policy takes into account
the monetary policy reaction. If ﬁscal policy takes monetary decisions as given,
monetary conservatism results in an increased ﬁscal spending bias. Nevertheless,
the ﬁgure shows that an inﬂation conservative central bank remains desirable
in the Nash and ML regimes, as a value of  slightly below one recovers the OI
outcome.
6.3 Implications for Stabilization Policy
Up to this point we restricted attention to steady state outcomes. This section
extends the analysis to a stochastic economy, considering stabilization policy
in response to technology and mark-up shocks. We thereby restrict attention
to the sequential policy regime that implements the Ramsey steady state, i.e.,
ﬁscal leadership and full monetary conservatism ( =1 ).19 We compare the
impulse responses for this policy regime with the Ramsey response to shocks.
We start by deriving conditions under which the Ramsey response can be
implemented by the sequential policy regime. Clearly, full monetary conser-
vatism implies that the central bank will implement stable prices at all times.
Therefore, a necessary condition for the optimality of the impulse response un-
der the considered policy arrangement is that the Ramsey allocation can be
implemented with a stable price path. The next proposition states that this is
also a su!cient condition:
Proposition 10 If the Ramsey response to shocks can be implemented with a
stable path for prices, then it is consistent with sequential policymaking in a
regime with ﬁscal leadership and fully conservative monetary policy ( =1 ).
The proof is given in appendix A.11; it involves showing that the ﬁrst or-
der conditions of the Ramsey problem with stable prices are identical to those
implied by ﬁscal leadership and a fully conservative monetary authority.
Given the result of proposition 10 the next question is then under which
conditions the Ramsey policy response may involve a stable price path in re-
sponse to shocks. The following proposition provides su!cient conditions for
t h er e s p o n s et oat e c h n o l o g ys h o c k .
19Since it is not obvious how to compare impulse responses across policy regimes involving
dierent steady states, we do not consider the Nash and monetary leadership cases.
20Proposition 11 Assume preferences over fw>k w and jw are of the constant rel-
ative risk class. If private and public consumption have the same coe!cient of
relative risk aversion and { =0 , then the Ramsey response to a technology shock
involves no deviation from price stability.
The proof is given in appendix A.12. The proof shows that price stability is
optimal if the Ramsey response implies a stable private consumption to output
ratio as well as a stable public consumption to output ratio. Maintaining both
ratios constant is not possible in the presence of a positive and constant level of
ﬁscal waste ({A0), because total output responds to technology shocks. Thus,
sequential policymaking with ﬁscal leadership and a fully conservative central
bank will generally fail to implement the Ramsey response to a technology shock.
We now turn to the case of a mark-up shock. The Ramsey response then
generally involves deviations from price stability, even if the assumptions of
proposition 11 are satisﬁed. We illustrate this point in ﬁgure 2 for the baseline
parametrization of section 5. The ﬁgure depicts the impulse responses to a
positive mark-up shock under the Ramsey policy, as well as for the case with
ﬁscal leadership and a fully conservative central bank.20 While the Ramsey
response involves an initial increase in inﬂation followed by a small but persistent
amount of deﬂation, the sequential policy regime implements stable prices at
all times. Overall, the deviations from price stability under the Ramsey policy
seem small (in the order of less than 0.1% per quarter) and the responses dier
across regimes only for the early periods following a shock.
The following proposition provides an explanation for why the response un-
der sequential policy turns out to be so similar to the Ramsey response. The
proof is given in appendix A.13.
Proposition 12 Sequential policymaking in a regime with ﬁscal leadership and
fully conservative monetary policy ( =1 )i sc o n s i s t e n tw i t ht h eR a m s e yr e -
sponse to shocks under ﬂexible prices.
A regime with ﬁscal leadership and full monetary conservatism eliminates
all gaps to the Ramsey equilibrium with ﬂexible prices. The presence of sticky
prices, however, may allow the Ramsey planner to improve somewhat upon
the ﬂexible price response, see Adao et al. (2003). While the stabilization
policy associated with ﬁscal leadership and full monetary conservatism may not
be always fully optimal, the previous proposition suggests that such a policy
arrangement remains close to fully optimal as it implements the optimal ﬂexible
price equilibrium.
20Responses are for a positive three standard deviation of the mark-up shock, and presented
in terms of quarterly percent deviations from steady state values.
217C o n c l u s i o n s
This paper analyzes the policy biases associated with sequential monetary and
ﬁscal policymaking in a stylized dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model.
The paper also asks whether installing an inﬂation conservative central bank
remains desirable in a setting with endogenous ﬁscal policy.
While the lack of ﬁscal commitment can make it optimal to implement pos-
itive inﬂation rates (for simultaneous decision making or monetary leadership),
the optimal deviations from price stability turn out to be quantitiatively small.
In addition, the inﬂation bias resulting from lack of monetary commitment tends
to generate too much inﬂation for a wide range of model parameterizations. In-
stalling a conservative central bank is therefore welfare improving.
In a setting with ﬁscal leadership, arguably the most relevant case, installing
a fully conservative central bank focusing exclusively on stabilizing inﬂation
eliminates not only the inﬂation bias but also the ﬁscal spending bias in steady
state. The case for monetary conservatism may thus be even stronger in a setting
with endogenous ﬁscal policy. Moreover, ﬁscal leadership with full conservatism
implements the optimal stabilization policy under ﬂexible prices, which tends
to be close to optimal if not fully optimal.
A number of important questions remain to be addressed in further research.
In particular, for a positive description of monetary and ﬁscal policy interactions,
it seems important to consider also distortionary taxation and government debt
dynamics. These elements introduce additional interactions between monetary
and ﬁscal policymakers that may have a major impact on the desirability of an
inﬂation conservative monetary authority. We plan to extend the analysis to
such richer settings in future work.
22A Appendix
A.1 Ramsey Steady State
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1 =0for m =1 >2. W ed e n o t et h eR a m s e ys t e a d ys t a t eb yd r o p p i n g
time subscripts. Equation (25), xfw A 0 and Uw  1 imply
2 =0
Equations (26) delivers
3 = xj A 0
This and equation (24) gives
 =1













xkk + xj =0 (28)





xff (1 + )
(29)
Substituting (29) into (28) delivers
xk 
xf  xj
xff (1 + )
xkk + xj =0














Using (27) again to substitute

1+ delivers (14) shown in the main text.
A.2 Sequential Fiscal Reaction Function
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taking as given Uw+m1 and other variables dated w+m for m  1. The ﬁrst order
































w }w =0 (31)
1
w xfw(2w  1)  3
w (w  1) = 0 (32)
xjw  3
w =0 (33)





Using the previous result and (33) to substitute the Lagrange multipliers in (31)
delivers FRF shown in the main text.
A.3 Sequential Monetary Reaction Function
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taking as given jw+m1 and other variables dated w+m for m  1. The ﬁrst order
































w }w =0 (35)
1
w xfw(2w  1)  3







Equation (37), xfw A 0 and Uw  1 imply
2
w =0
Then solving (34), (35) and (36) for 3
w delivers, respectively,
3
w = xfw + 1
w
μ
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(41)

















From (41) and (42) one obtains MRF shown in the main text.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 2
We ﬁrst show that MRF cannot hold in the neighborhood of  =1 .I ns t e a d y







+ R(  1) = 0 (43)
where R(  1) summarizes terms that converge to zero as (  1) $ 0.I na
steady state with  =1equation (8) delivers 1+ + xk




1+ ? 1. Since the implicit function xf
xk() deﬁned by (8) exists, this implies
that xf
xk is bounded away from 1 also in a su!ciently small neighborhood
around  =1 . Therefore, (43) cannot hold in the neighborhood of  =1 .
Moreover, from U  1 and (9) we have    in steady state. For  su!ciently
close to 1, it then follows that MRF can only hold if  A 1.
A.5 Proof of Proposition 4













where f()>k()>j() denote the steady state levels emerging under sequen-
tial ﬁscal policy when monetary policy implements inﬂation rate ,a n dt h e
derivatives xm (m = f>k>j) are evaluated at this steady state. We ﬁrst evaluate














26Using this result and (16), equation (44) can be rewritten as
gx
g
=( xf  xj)
Cf
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To determine the sign of Cf@C we totally dierentiate equations (FRF), (8),



















































Assuming xkk ? 0, signing these expression delivers Cf
C A 0 and
Cj
C ? 0,a s
claimed. The former inequality and equation (46) imply gx
g A 0, locally at
 =1 .
A.6 Utility Weights
For the period utility speciﬁcation (18), the Ramsey policy marginal conditions















Assuming f =0 =16, k =0 =2, j =0 =04,  = 6 and * =1one obtains the
parameter values in table 1.
27A.7 Solving for the Equilibrium with Sequential Mone-
tary and Fiscal Policy
The Markov-perfect Nash equilibrium with sequential monetary and ﬁscal policy






mx(fw+m>k w+m>j w+m) (49)
s.t.
Equations (8),(9),(10) for all w
Hw (fw+m>k w+m>w+m>U w+m>j w+m) given for m  1
One should note that FRF and MRF need not be imposed, since they can
already be derived from the ﬁrst order conditions of this problem, see sections
4.3.1 and 4.3.2, respectively. Therefore, the solution of problem (49) will always
satisfy FRF and MRF.
Then, the recursive formulation of the Lagrangian of problem (49) is







{i (·)+HwZ (}w+1> w+1)} (50)
s.t.
}w+1 =( 1 })+}}w + %}w+1
w+1 = (1  )+w + %w+1
where the one-period return is
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with the expectations functions
HDV






taken as given. The additional control variables 1
w , 2
w, 3
w are the Lagrange
multipliers associated with the implementability constraints (8) and (9), and
the feasibility constraint (10), respectively.
We then solve for the steady state using the ﬁrst order conditions of the
recursive formulation (50). Thereafter, we compute a quadratic approximation
28of the one-period return i(·) around this steady state. This involves quadrat-
ically approximating the implementability and feasibility constraints. Instead,
the expectation functions HDV
w and HLV




1 (}w  1) + d1




1 (}w  1) + d2
2 (w  ) (54)
Importantly, postulating linear expectation functions is su!cient to obtain a
ﬁrst order approximation to the equilibrium dynamics and policy functions.
The policymaker takes expectations functions as given, therefore, they do not
show up in dierentiated form in the ﬁrst order conditions. Moreover, linear
expectations functions are su!cient to evaluate the Lagrangian, i.e., utility, up
to second order. This is the case since either the implementability constraints or
the associated Lagrange multipliers are zero in a su!ciently small neighborhood
around the steady state. As a result, no ﬁrst order terms appear when evaluating
the quadratic approximation of i(·) at the solution. Obviously, this is just a
restatement of the fact that (50) is an unconstrained optimization problem.
We now explain how we compute the expectation functions (53) and (54).
We start with an initial guess for d
m
l (m =1 >2; l =0 >1>2), then we solve (50)
with i(·) replaced by its quadratic approximation. We update 
m
l, as explained
below, and continue iterating until the maximum absolute change of the policy
functions drops below the square root of machine precision, i.e., 1=49 · 108.
Let the solution for the policy functions f(·) and (·) be given by
fw+1  f = f} (}w+1  1) + f (w+1  ) (55)
w+1   = } (}w+1  1) +  (w+1  ) (56)
where variables without time subscript denote steady state values. A ﬁrst order
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Hw (w+1  )
where |vv indicates expressions evaluated at steady state. These together with
(55), (56) and
Hw (}w+1  1) = } (}w  1)
Hw (w+1  )= (w  )
deliver the expectations functions consistent with the approximated policy func-
tions
29d1
0 = xf(  1)
d1
1 = } [(  1)xfff} + xf(2  1)}]
d1
2 =  [(  1)xfff + xf(2  1)]
d2


















A.8 Consumption Losses Relative to Ramsey




represent the period utility for the steady state of an alternative
policy regime. The permanent reduction in private consumption that would
imply the Ramsey steady state to be welfare equivalent to the alternative policy




















where the second equality uses equation (18). Therefore, one obtains








A.9 Conservative Monetary Reaction Function








































}w+mkw+m  fw+m 

2
(w+m  1)2  jw+m  {
¸¾
30taking as given jw+m1 and variables dated w + m for m  1. The ﬁrst order
conditions w.r.t. (fw>k w>w>U w), respectively, are given by
(1  )xfw + 1
w
μ






























wxfw(2w  1)  3







Equation (60), xfw A 0 and Uw  1 imply
2
w =0
Then solving (57), (58) and (59) for 3
w delivers, respectively,
3
w =( 1 )xfw + 1
w
μ
















































xfw ((w  1)w  }wkw (1 + w))
(64)























From (64) and (65) one obtains CMRF shown in the main text.
A.10 Proof of Proposition 8
Full monetary conservatism implies that w  1, see CMRF. Substituting
w  1 for (CMRF), noting that (9) can be dropped as it only deﬁnes Uw,a n d





















for all w (66)
{fw+m>k w+m>j w+m} given for m  1
Letting w denote the Lagrange multiplier on (66), the FOCs w.r.t. (fw>j w> w),








































Using the last FOC above to substitute the term xfw on the left-hand side of












The sequential equilibrium under ﬁscal leadership and full monetary conser-
vatism is thus described by the solution to (66), (67), (10), w =1 ,a n d( 9 ) .
Steady state versions of these equations characterize the Ramsey steady state,
see section 4.2.
A.11 Proof of Proposition 10
Appendix A.10 has shown that the equilibrium with ﬁscal leadership and full
monetary conservatism is described by (66), (67), (9), (10), and w  1.W en o w
show that the same equations characterize the Ramsey equilibrium, provided
w  1 is optimal. Equations (9), (10) and (66) are also constraints imposed on
the Ramsey problem for w  1. It thus remains to be shown that the Ramsey






















+ xjw}w =0 (69)







xffw}w (1 + w)
Using this to eliminate 1
w in (69) and employing again (66) delivers (67).
A.12 Proof of Proposition 11
The FOCs of the Ramsey problem consist of equations (22)-(26), (8), (9), and
(10). Using 2
w =0and 3
w = xjw, noting that the Euler equation can be
dropped as it only deﬁnes Uw, and setting w =  (we are interested in the


































xfw(2w  1)  xjw(w  1) = 0 (72)










 xfw+1(w+1  1)w+1 =0 (73)
}wkw  fw 

2
(w  1)2  jw  { =0 (74)
We now show that these FOCs are satisﬁed for a stable price path under the












where expressions without time subscript denote steady state values. From (72)
follows that w =1 also requires
1
w = 1 (76)










Under CRRA preferences for labor, kw
xkkw
xkw is constant and the previous equation





















xf and CRRA utility implies
that xffwfw







The FOCs (70)-(73) thus hold for w =1provided (75)-(78) hold. Therefore,
if in addition to (75)-(78) also (74) holds, all FOCs of the Ramsey problem are
satisﬁed with a stable path for prices. We now show that this is the case for








































jw is constant. The latter, { =0 , and equation (74) for w =1
imply that fw
}wkw is constant, as required by (78).
A.13 Proof of Proposition 12
The proof of proposition 8 in section A.10 shows that the sequential equilibrium
under ﬁscal leadership and full monetary conservatism is described by the so-
lution to (66), (67), (10), w =1 , and (9). Under ﬂexible prices, constraint (8)
has to be substituted by (66) in the Ramsey problem. The proof of proposition
10, given in section 11, then shows that the same set of equations characterize
the Ramsey equilibrium under ﬂexible prices.
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36Parameter Deﬁnition Assigned Value
quarterly discount factor  =0 =9913
price elasticity of demand  = 6
degree of price stickiness  =1 7 =5
1/elasticity of labor supply * =1
ﬁscal waste { =0
utility weight on labor eort $k =2 6 =042
utility weight on public goods $j =0 =227
technology shock persistence } =0 =95
mark-up shock persistence  =0 =96
quarterly s.d. technology shock innovation s.d.(%}w)=0 =006
quarterly s.d. mark-up shock innovation s.d.(%w)=0 =021
Table 1: Baseline Calibration
Policy fk  j Consumption Losses
Regime (Deviations from Ramsey) Relative to Ramsey SS
SP 0=44% 0=67% 1=46% 0=48% 1=03%
OI 0=83% 0=85% 0=09% 7=5% 0=07%
Table 2: Steady State Eects
37Consumption Losses Inﬂation Dierentials
Relative to Ramsey SS VS  RL
OI SP (Quarterly)
Baseline Calibration 0=07% 1=03% 1=37%
more competition ( = 9) 0=03% 0=21% 0=56%
less competition ( = 3) 0=37% 8=86% 4=49%
more sticky prices ( =5 0 ) 0=07% 2=04% 1=19%
less sticky prices ( =5 ) 0=06% 0=36% 1=34%
almost ﬂexible prices ( =0 =5) 0=03% 0=05% 0=58%
very low labor supply elasticity (* =8 ) 0=06% 0=07% 0=07%
low labor supply elasticity (* =3 ) 0=12% 0=33% 0=53%
high labor supply elasticity (* =0 =1) 0=01% 2=11% 2=17%
wasteful ﬁscal spending ({ =0 =05) 0=06% 0=98% 1=12%
Table 3: Robustness of Steady State Eects








Consumption Losses Relative to Ramsey SS






















Figure 1: Welfare Gains From Monetary Conservatism















































































Gross Inflation Rate (Pi)


















































































































Figure 2: Impulse Responses to Mark-up Shocks (Baseline Calibration)
41